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ABSTRACT
Mega-scale information technology (IT) projects in the public sector are significant undertakings operating within an ecosystem of stakeholders, resources, and constraints. The
track record of these projects is abysmal. Employing an ecosystems lens, we study three failed
mega-scale public sector IT projects: the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Virtual
Case File (VCF), the U.S. federal government’s HealthCare.gov project, and Great Britain’s
National Programme for IT (NPfIT). A forensic analysis of these projects was conducted
employing the Qualitative Media Analysis (QMA) methodology. The findings suggest several
stakeholders in a public IT project assume roles analogous to different types of species in an
ecosystem, with the public agency sponsoring the project as the keystone species. Specifically,
the findings show that the public agency is susceptible to failure in hiring key personnel without proper knowledge and experience, and failure in responding to early signals alerting
the impending implosion of the project ecosystem. In addition, flawed relationships between
the public agency and contractors, and flawed relationship between the legislature and the
public agency also contributed significantly to project failure.
Keywords: Information technology, public sector, mega-scale projects, project failure,
ecosystem.
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RÉSUMÉ
Les projets de technologies de l'information (TI) à grande échelle dans le secteur public
sont des entreprises importantes qui opèrent dans un écosystème d'intervenants, de ressources
et de contraintes. En utilisant le concept d’écosystème, ce projet de recherche étudie trois
projets TI à grande échelle dans le secteur public qui ont échoué : le U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s (FBI) Virtual Case File (VCF), le projet U.S. federal government’s HealthCare.
gov et le projet britannique National Programme for IT (NPfIT). Une analyse de ces projets
a été réalisée à l'aide de la méthodologie Analyse Qualitative Média (QMA). Les résultats
suggèrent que plusieurs parties prenantes dans un grand projet public TI assument des rôles
analogues à différents types d'espèces dans un écosystème avec l'agence publique soutenant
le projet dans en tant qu'espèce clé. Plus précisément, les résultats montrent que l'agence
publique est susceptible de ne pas embaucher du personnel clé ayant les connaissances
et l'expérience appropriées, et de ne pas réagir aux signaux précoces alertant sur l'imminence de l'implosion de l'écosystème du projet. De plus, les failles dans les relations entre
l'organisme public et les entrepreneurs sous contrat et dans les relations entre la législature
et l'organisme public contribuent également de façon importante à l'échec du projet.
Mots-clés : Technologies de l’information, secteur public, projet à grande échelle, échec
de projet, écosysteme.

1. INTRODUCTION
Information technology (IT) project
failures are commonplace in the public
sector (Gauld, 2007; Purao & Desouza,
2010; Bozeman, 2002; Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius &
Rothengatter, 2003). According to a report
by The Standish Group, between 2003 and
2012, only 6% of federal IT projects in the
US with over $10 million in labor costs were
successful. Unfortunately, when IT projects
fail in the public sector they fail spectacularly due to their mega-scale. These IT
projects involve tens—if not hundreds—of
millions of dollars, span multiple years, and
encompass entire sectors of the economy,
in addition to having national-level impacts.
A stinging example of a government IT
failure was the eHealth project initiated by
Ontario’s Ministry of Health. The system was
built to enable sharing of electronic health
records such as lab tests, diagnostic imaging,

and drugs and immunization records with
other doctors. It was started despite the
fact that similar efforts were underway
in the provinces of Québec and British
Columbia. In 2011, the auditor general
of Québec declared that their efforts had
failed. Ontario’s estimated $1 billion investment in a health information network was
“significantly underutilized” because its
infrastructure, including an internal e-mail
system, was markedly inferior to private
sector alternatives. To date, the project is
still not fully functional with an estimated
cost of over $1 billion (Webster, 2012).
Another example is the following initiative from the Australian Public Transport
of Victoria: the development of the Myki,
a contactless smartcard ticketing system
used on public transport projected to cost
$999 million in 2005. In 2008, the cost-estimate had increased to $1.35 billion due
to “reliability problems” (Own motion
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investigation into ICT-enabled projects,
2011). The project fell four years behind
schedule; inexperienced project managers
and two different CEO turnovers occurred
during the life of the project (Brouwer et
al., 2011).
Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) coined the term
“megafailures paradox” to refer to the continued investment in mega-projects without
first understanding why failures occur. While
there is a growing literature that is examining mega-scale projects, many of these
efforts focus on public infrastructure projects (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Han et al., 2009;
Van Marrewijk, 2007; Yuttapongsontorn et
al., 2008). The literature on mega-scale IT
projects in the public sector remains scant.
This paper aims to fill the void.
Scholars have only recently started to
acknowledge the fact that mega-scale IT
projects operate within a very complex
environment of stakeholders, organization norms and capabilities, resources,
constraints, and external influences (Purao
& Desouza, 2010; Becker et al., 2011; Dille
& Söderlund, 2011). For example, Dille
and Söderlund (2011) introduced the term
“inter-institutional project” to describe projects involving actors representing different
institutional environments and discussed
the critical need for researchers to differentiate such types of projects and develop
theoretical and empirical understanding
of the management of inter-institutional
projects, by taking into consideration the
complex interactions among institutional
stakeholders. Hodgson and Cicmil (2008)
argued that too often project managers
are regarded as implementers that merely
address issues of control and content which
reduces their chances to act as social and
political actors for the benefit of the project (p 5).
An ecosystem, a concept originated from
ecology (Tansley, 1935; Van Dyne, 1969;
Odum, 1953; Hollings, 1973), also describes

a large number of entities operating at
various scales and networks, including
participating species and the interactions
among them, natural resources, external
influences, laws of physics, and so on.
The fate of a natural ecosystem is determined by the intricate balance of these
factors. Similarly, an IT project ecosystem is
driven by a variety of factors. Under certain
conditions, the ecosystem in which the IT
project is originated and developed may
be receptive. However, some of its configurations may also be hostile toward the
project. For instance, when a large-scale IT
project involves multiple institutions, the
conflicting organizational norms regarding
the timing of different project phases and
activities leads to “temporal misfit” (Dille &
Söderlund, 2011, 2013), which undermines
project success. We argue that the ecosystem view provides a valuable perspective in
the attempt to understand the multiplicity
of forces, and the rich interactions among
key players, that contribute to the demise
of a mega-scale IT project.
We study three mega-scale IT projects
conducted in the public sector: the U.S.
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI)
Virtual Case File (VCF); the launch of the
U.S. HealthCare.gov as the focal deliverable
of President Obama’s Affordable Care Act;
and Great Britain’s National Programme for
IT (NPfIT), launched by the National Health
Service. These three projects were focused
on introducing technological solutions
to support public policy outcomes. We
chose these three projects as the technical
solutions were rather similar in terms of
complexity yet each project operated within
different ecosystems—for example, supportive (FBI VCF) or hostile (HealthCare.
gov and NPfIT) (see Section 2.2).
The overall goal of this research is to
uncover the complexities of mega-scale
public sector IT projects that led to the
projects’ failure employing an ecosystem
11
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lens. This paper provides an analysis of
these three cases between two contradictory
ecosystems that operate in the same global
context, for example, the U.S. (Healthcare.
gov and FBI VCF), and between ecosystems
within the same domain (i.e., healthcare)
compared across global locations (U.S. and
U.K.). Specifically, we conducted a qualitative forensic analysis of these three projects
to dissect how and why these types of projects implode. Despite project differences,
we presuppose that there are similar issues
that contributed to their failure. Applying
the ecosystem lens, we focused on the
interactions among the species (stakeholders) involved in the project ecosystems.
The contributions of this study include:
identification of key species in a mega-scale
public IT project ecosystem; identification
of the failures of the public agency in performing the keystone species role of the
project ecosystem; identification of flaws
in the relationshps between the public
agency and contractors, and flaws in the
relationship between the legislature and
the public agency. These failures and flaws
are the consistent factors in explaining the
tendency for mega-scale public IT projects
to fail.

2. BACKGROUND
2.1. Mega-scale public sector IT
projects
Over the last few years, IT projects in the
public sector have increased in frequency,
scale, scope, and complexity. The track
record of these projects is abysmal. Notably,
a study of 1471 large IT projects primarily
consisting of US-based projects for public
agencies revealed that one in six of those
projects became a “black swan,” or a statistical outlier due to expensive cost overruns

(Flyvbjerg & Budzier, 2009). These increasing IT expenditures incite a pressing need
to ask questions about how to avoid project
failure. Bozeman and Bretschneider (1986)
recognized that implementation of IT in the
public sector would require a fundamentally different approach. They asserted that
private sector principles could not be effectively translated to the public sector, that is,
a new management framework would need
to be designed for public sector IT projects.
Scholars have also noted that IT projects in
the public sector necessitate more attention to issues of openness, accountability,
representativeness, and external and vertical
linkages (Rocheleau & Wu, 2002; Cats-Barni
& Thompson, 1995; Purao & Desouza, 2010;
Becker et al., 2011; Desouza, 2015).
Mega-scale IT projects have enormously
dense patterns of interaction and these
patterns often lack coherence and transparency (Grabher, 2002). For example,
while Newell et al. (2008) note that large
IT projects with complex objectives usually
require work to be carried out in multiple subprojects (instead of one large project), subprojects tend to be less defined,
and they are unlikely to be governed with
pre-set goals. The subprojects are often
haphazardly mashed together in hopes
that a coherent product and innovative
outcome will emerge. This aspect of megascale IT projects in the public sector makes
these undertakings categorically different
from private sector IT endeavors because
numerous non-technical factors (i.e., political pressure, oversight by legislative committees, economic constraints and realities,
internal cultural and cross-agency politics,
etc.) have a direct impact on project outcomes. In short, projects in the public sector
are heavily impacted by sociopolitical and
economic conditions (Lamb et al., 2013).
Dysfunctional internal dynamics are frequently observed in failed mega-scale public
projects. Public employees enact various

12
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behaviors, such as avoidance, normalization
of bad behavior, dishonesty, etc. that contribute to project failure. These actions have
been regularly seen in public agencies where
employees are forced to live with and react
to a set of constraints that they have little
to no control over. For instance, Flyvbjerg
(2009) identifies a pattern where officials
avoid talking about project problems or
even acknowledging failures after they have
happened. Pinto (2006) argues that leaders
who avoid red flags also normalize deviance,
and bad behavior becomes ingrained in the
organizational culture. Such normalization
often happens as a kind of flawed or rationalized cost-benefit analysis. Crises and
unforeseen events such as terrorism, market
collapses, recessions, software issues, cost
overruns, and missed deadlines are all problems that have to be addressed. Flyvbjerg
(2005) notes the problematic practice of
strategic misrepresentation where decision-makers or politicians underestimate
the cost and overvalue the benefits of their
projects to draw funding. Yourdon (2004)
coined the term death march projects to
describe undertakings that are typically set
up to fail and operate under the hope or
expectation that the project team will perform some type of miracle and find success.
Pinto (2013) highlights plan massaging as
a method of shortening a timeline after it
has already been agreed upon. While these
studies have addressed various aspects of
individual managers’ faults in mega-scale
public IT project failures, to our knowledge,
there is still a dearth of research that provides a holistic and theory-driven view of
the tendency for public organizations to
suffer such failures.

2.2. Ecosystem view
of mega-scale IT projects
While an IT project has traditionally been
viewed as an isolated, bounded, temporary organization, an emerging stream of

research emphasizes the need to interpret project organization and outcome in
the institutional environment (Kadefors,
1995; Engwall, 2003; Dille & Söderlund,
2011). Mega-scale public sector IT projects, in particular, are driven by a complex network of stakeholders and interactions and inter-relationships among these
stakeholders (Dille & Söderlund, 2011).
Many researchers have noted that such
complex interactions among actors within
and outside a social organization resemble
the interactions among species in a natural
ecosystem (e.g., Becker et al., 2011).
Applying the ecosystem analogy in the
specific context of business organizations,
Moore (1996) coined the term business
ecosystem to describe “an economic community supported by a foundation of interacting organizations and individuals—the
organisms of the business world. This economic community produces goods and
services of value to customers, who are
themselves members of the ecosystem.
The member organizations also include
suppliers, lead producers, competitors,
and other stakeholders. Over time, they
co-evolve their capabilities and roles, and
tend to align themselves with the directions
set by one or more central companies”
(p. 9). Koenig (2012) further developed a
typology that classifies business ecosystems
into four distinct types: supply systems,
platforms, communities of destiny, and
expanding communities. Supply systems,
in particular, describes a business ecosystem that is “controlled by a principal who
delegates to its constituents certain complementary contributions to achieve the
strategic activity” (p. 215). When an organization delegates subtasks to contractors
during a large scale IT project, the project
ecosystem exemplifies a supply system. In
analyzing industries such as mobile computing, researchers have found the ecosystem view to provide a more accurate
representation of the competitive dynamics
13
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Table 1. Summary of the ecosystem of the three cases.
Case

Country

Sector

Political
climate

Duration
of project

Managed by

FBI VCF

U.S.A.

Defense

Supportive

5 years

One federal
agency

Healthcare.
gov

U.S.A.

Health

Strong
opposition

3 years

Two
government
agencies

NPfIT

U.K.

Health

Controversial

9 years

One
government
agency

compared to the traditional supply chain or
value chain views (e.g., Rong & Shi, 2009).
Other types of socioeconomic ecosystems
have been proposed and all share one key
defining feature: the presence of a network
of interacting entities (Briscoe, 2010; Li
et al., 2012). For example, an organization could be viewed as a social ecosystem
considering social interactions among the
members, or a knowledge ecosystem where
the knowledge transfer and exchange are
the focus (Briscoe, 2010; Li et al., 2012).
Prior research on IT project failures tends
to focus on specific aspect(s) of IT projects (e.g., viewing IT projects as a type of
organizational activity to be managed, and
examining the role of project management
practices in project outcomes), overlooking
the complex interactions that exist in an
IT project ecosystem. Therefore, in this
study, we apply the ecosystems lens to
understand the nature of public sector
organizations that lead to their tendency
to suffer mega-scale IT project failures.
The ecosystem perspective provides an
interesting perspective to study mega-scale
public IT projects by permitting us to study
species (stakeholders) that interact and are
impacted by mega-scale projects.
We purposely chose to study three projects that operated in very different ecosystems. Specifically, we chose projects that

Number of Overall
contractors budget
Two primary
$581
contractors
million
One lead
contractor
and over 50
$133.6
contractors
million
and
subcontractors
Four
contractors

£10
billion

had varied in the political climate, level of
public scrutiny, scale, and operated in, and
interacted with, stakeholders in different
sectors (see Table 1).
2.2.1. Political climate
The VCF project was accelerated by
the post-September 11th political climate.
National security was championed by political leaders, the public sector, and citizens
alike due to a heightened fear of terrorism.
On the other hand, the HealthCare.gov project grew out of President Obama’s election
promises. The passage of the Affordable
Care Act (ACA) led to political intractability
and infighting in Washington D.C., eventually resulting in a government shutdown
in late 2013. In contrast to the VCF, support
for HealthCare.gov was decidedly lacking.
The NPfIT came from a strong governmental
will to modernize its health service, which
was often handled locally with no possibilities to coordinate medical information
efficiently through a system. The NPfIT was
heavily discussed and portrayed as a controversy in the political debate as, for instance,
the requirement analysis was poorly done
(e.g., users were not involved enough in the
requirement phase and it failed to address
the confidentiality of patients’ health information). The controversial political climate
that the project faced was also due to a
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recent history of failed projects (e.g., the
1992 and 1998 Information Management
& Technology strategies) that aimed at
improving health care services but failed
to deliver their promises (Wainwright &
Waring, 2000).
2.2.2. Public scrutiny
The FBI faced intense scrutiny from the
public and government officials immediately
following 9/11. It was a mix of this scrutiny
and extreme patriotism that drove the project’s acceleration (Verton, 2003). However,
work on the VCF was done outside of the
public eye and did not directly impact everyday citizens. The debates on the policy
options and ramifications of overhauling
the healthcare system was public. Political
leaders, pundits, and even the citizenry
were split on their views regarding the
policy. Regardless, given the public nature
of the debate, the time period immediately
preceding the rollout of HealthCare.gov
portal had focused the country’s attention on the project. The NPfIT underwent
scrutiny due to early signs of project complexity, confidentiality of information, lack
of consultation of key stakeholders, etc., as
it impacted the future of patients in the U.K.
The media brought attention to these issues
but also to the high cost of the project for
taxpayers (Maughan, 2010).
2.2.3. Scale
The VCF project was conducted within
one federal agency while the work on
HealthCare.gov was managed chiefly by
two government agencies. Additionally, the
VCF project employed two primary contractors over the five-year life of the project,
while the HealthCare.gov undertaking had
over 50 contractors/subcontractors, major
and minor consultants, and other public

agencies to contend with over a brief threeyear period. The NPfIT was then led by the
Director General of National Health Service
(NHS) IT who contracted four vendors (BT,
Accenture, CSC, and Fujitsu) to work on
the then five health authority regions in
which the system was to be implemented.
Those regions or clusters were: North East;
North West and West Midlands, Eastern,
London, and Southern (Campion-Awwad
et al., 2014). The difference in the range
of stakeholders involved and the number
of entities that had legitimate control over
the project’s fate makes for interesting
comparisons from an ecosytems viewpoint.
2.2.4. Sectorial differences
These three projects operated in, and
interacted with, stakeholders in different
sectors. They are in the defense and healthcare sectors, which have large numbers of
powerful external stakeholders vying for
influence. These include major pharmaceutical companies, arms industries supporting
the world’s largest military, defense and
engineering contractors, various lobbying
groups, and numerous employees. The
two healthcare projects Healthcare.gov
and the NPfIT were from two different
countries (the U.S.A. and the U.K.) with
two different kinds of bureaucratic and
political structures. Further, sectorial issues
are compounded by the role of monopolies
(or near monopolies) and their interests,
especially monopolies related to large
contracts. Sectoral differences also bring out
nuances associated with power dynamics in
networks, the appreciation (or lack thereof)
for sector-level innovation, lobbying and
political influence that impacts the level
of control and power the public agency
may (or may not) have to influence the
trajectory of a project during all phases from
the request for proposals to development,
implementation, and ongoing maintenance.
15
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3. METHODOLOGY
We employed a multiple case study
approach to explain failures that occurred
in the FBI VCF, the HealthCare.gov, and
the NPfIT projects. This is the preferred
strategy when “how” or “why” questions
are being posed and when the focus of
the research is on a real-life context (Yin,
1989). Multiple case studies also allow for
comparative conclusions to be drawn.
Data captured for the case studies were
gathered from a wide range of sources,
that is, news outlets, journal publications,
reports, case studies, records, and other
publicly available documents. This approach
is an effective means of analyzing data when
dealing with sensitive issues or a hard-toreach sample. Qualitative Media Analysis
(QMA) was used as the method of analysis.
QMA is an analytical tool that requires the
researcher to study documents to uncover
their relevance, significance, and meaning
informed by the researchers’ theoretical lens
(Altheide, 1996). Additionally, QMA is a useful
tool because it investigates documents, their
narrative structure, context, bias, cultural
focus, and thematic emphasis to arrive at
multiple perspectives of a single occurrence.
Altheide (1996) categorizes successful
document analysis into the following five
stages: 1) document unit analysis, 2) protocol development and data collection,
3) data coding and organization, 4) data
analysis, and 5) reports. First, a unit analysis
and the appropriate content/documents to
collect for the study should be identified.
Identifying the appropriate content or documents is extremely important because it
provides context and significance for how
the data will help define the cases. Second,
a protocol is to be developed to define the
characteristics present in the data and determine testing procedures in a pilot round.
A data collection sheet is included in the
protocol because it outlines the variables

to be considered in the study. Third, once
data has been collected, it should be accurately coded. A midpoint analysis should be
completed to determine if any alterations
in the protocol are necessary. Fourth, data
analysis of the contrasting and similar themes present in each case is needed. Once
analysis has been completed, findings are
drawn and concluded. Finally, as findings
emerge, they should be integrated with the
key concepts of the study and reported.
A protocol was developed to outline the
variables to be included in the study. These
variables were selected to capture the key
dimensions of each project ecosystem and
the symptoms of the project failure. The
specific variables are failure, stakeholders,
disaster, media, political culture, internal constraints, and external constraints.
The data collection consisted of collecting
media content on FBI VCF, HealthCare.
gov, and the NPfIT. Internet searches were
conducted to find troves of news stories,
reports, journal articles, social media posts,
etc. Approximately 420 pieces of data were
found and applied to the study protocol
for inclusion or for discard. The search
included data from before the initiation
of each project until their conclusions. A
wide net was cast because the theoretical
lens of this study values developments that
occurred before, during, and after project
failure, involving every stakeholder of the
project ecosystem. Searches for media
content included keywords such as: “failure,”
“contractors,” “public opinion,” “Congress,”
and “leadership,” to find varied data on the
topics. A total of 167 data sources were used:
HealthCare.gov had 67, VCF had 26, and the
NPfIT had 74. It should be noted that the
richness in data varied due to the nature and
publicness of each case. HealthCare.gov and
NPfIT were very public projects resulting in
a higher volume of media content.
The data were captured in three large,
comprehensive spreadsheets that served as a
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coding template. First, a detailed timeline of
social, political, and financial events integral
to the development of the studied projects
was outlined and coded. This timeline organized overall key events that spanned topic
areas and a variety of variables. In essence, it
plotted the projects from their antecedents,
actions, outcomes, and effects (see Figure 1
fo an illustration of the FBI VCF timeline).
In addition, a list of each stakeholder’s roles
and responsibilities in the development of
these projects was outlined and coded. This
dataset provided clarity into the various
stakeholders involved in each project and
the roles they were supposed to play as
outlined by contracts or formal agreements.
Furthermore, the same list of stakeholders
was used to build another dataset, which
plotted stakeholder actions and interactions
during the development of the projects
on a timeline. This dataset included such
information as correspondence, monies
received, reports of work performed, etc.
The data were then triangulated for accuracy and reliability by locating corroborating
information. This process ensured that
information was accurate and matched the

research protocol. Since media reports are
often rife with opinion and conjecture, all
factual information was corroborated to
weed out invalid, incorrect, or unsubstantiated data. We purposely retained specific
ideologies and viewpoints used in discussions of media overtones in order to reflect
the inherent politicization of these projects.
Analysis included key events extracted
from the spreadsheets to reveal similarities
and dissimilarities between the cases. All
three datasets were analyzed separately
and together to locate trends and patterns.
Analyzing the datasets together was useful
because it provided a holistic view of the
projects. For example, the contractor relationships looked very different for each
project on the dataset describing roles and
responsibilities. Yet when analyzed along
with the first dataset detailing the social,
political, and financial events in each project, they offered key insights into contractor
relationships, trends, and outcomes.
The following examples illustrate the process of triangulation of the methodology to
arrive at insights that are described in cases

Figure 1: Timeline of the FBI Virtual Case File.
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that then help drew key findings for this
paper. For instance, various data from the
cases showed that underqualified individuals
were assigned to the projects. More specifically, documents such as National Audit
Report (2006, 2011) or academic papers
(Hendy et al., 2005) on the NPfIT project
discussed the lack of experience of managers
put in charge of such a mega-scale project.
Documents on the FBI VCF showed evidence
of how the FBI project managers lacked the
right qualifications, both IT and business
knowledge, but also experience with the
public sector (Marchewka, 2010). Similarly,
documents from the cases show that the
funding of projects was not optimized. For
the HealthCare.gov project, Congress approved an additional $27.7 million (Morgan
& Hunter, 2013). For the FBI VCF, the FBI
requested an additional $70 million from
Congress to accelerate the Trilogy project
and received $78 million (Marchewka, 2010);
for the NPfIT, an additional £3.6 was added
to the projected cost (Syal, 2013). These
items of information taken together show
trends in how the projects were conducted
in similar or different ecosystems.

4. THE TALE OF THREE MEGASCALE HEALTH IT PROJECTS
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
This section will describe three mega-scale
public sector IT projects: the U.S. Federal
Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Virtual Case
File (VCF); HealthCare.gov in the U.S. and
National Health Service (NHS) in the U.K.

organizational plan (Goldstein, 2005). By the
year 2000, over 50 independent application
systems were in place. This patchwork of
systems, which were written in different
programming languages and running on disparate platforms, failed to provide the most
basic needs for an intelligence and security
agency, namely, the sharing of relevant case
data between FBI divisions and field offices
(Marchewka, 2014). The FBI’s Automated
Case Support (ACS)—designed as a back-up
for paper-based case management protocols—was so poorly designed that agents
were required to navigate through 13
computer screens just to upload a single
document in the system (US DOJ Officer of
Inspector General, 2005). Data management
challenges were frequently encountered.
For instance, the FBI mishandled more
than 3,000 documents associated with the
trial of Timothy McVeigh for his role in the
1995 Oklahoma City Bombing (CBS News
Staff, 2001). A 2005 report by the Office
of the Inspector General delineated the
shortcomings of the FBI’s pre-9/11 systems (The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
management, 2005):
• More than 13,000 of the FBI’s computers were 4–8 years old and incapable
of running modern software;
• Communication networks between and
within FBI offices were up to 12 years old;
• Network speeds were equivalent to a
56k modem;
• Many networking components were
no longer manufactured or supported;

4.1. Virtual Case File

• Agents were unable to reliably email
each other, U.S. Attorneys’ offices, or other
federal agencies.

4.1.1. Context

4.1.2. The Project

Throughout the 1990s, the FBI developed
information systems without an overarching

In September 2000, the U.S. Congress
approved $379.8 million for a three-year FBI
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Information Technology Upgrade Project
(FITUP) under then-FBI Director Louis
Freeh and CIO Bob E. Dies. The FITUP
soon divided into three parts and was renamed Trilogy. During the summer of 2001,
two different contractors, DynCorp and
Science Applications International Corp
(SAIC), were hired to work on Trilogy. The
three-stage initiative would upgrade the
FBI’s inadequate IT capabilities: SAIC would
develop software upgrades and DynCorp
would be responsible for hardware (Office
of Inspector General, 2005).
On September 4, 2001, Robert Mueller
was appointed to the FBI Director role and
took charge of Trilogy. The September 11th
attacks occurred just days after the FBI’s
leadership change, shifting Trilogy into overdrive. Mueller gave orders for the project to
be completed as soon as technically possible
(Verton, 2003). He hired Robert Chiaradio,
the agent in charge of the Tampa, Florida
FBI field office, to assist with the project.
Chiaradio concluded that the current plans
for creating a web interface to support the
antiquated ACS system would be insufficient. He needed an alternative solution that
would allow agents to search across various
investigations to find relationships to their
own cases (Goldstein, 2005). In need of
further assistance, Chiaradio hired Larry
Depew, an agent who previously developed
a database system to track Mafia activities
in New Jersey (Marchewka, 2014). Over
the next month, Chiaradio and Depew
brainstormed new solutions to replace
the antiquated ACS system. In December
2001, they convinced Mueller that the FBI
needed an entirely new system that would
include an improved user interface and
database management system. Mueller instructed SAIC to stop their current work and
instead begin work on the new system,
referred to as the Virtual Case File (VCF)
system (Marchewka, 2014). Under increasing pressure to deliver an improved case
management system, Chiaradio and Depew

began taking shortcuts in the planning
and development stages. Joint Application
Development (JAD) sessions were held with
SAIC and other experts to define requirements for the new system. However, work
processes were not halted until the JAD
sessions were complete—resulting in numerous inefficiencies. Additionally, both the
FBI and SAIC agreed to complete the VCF
in 22 months. No backup plan was created
in the case that the VCF was unsuccessful
(Marchewka, 2014).
In January 2002, the FBI requested an
additional $70 million from Congress to
meet the accelerated deadline. Not only did
Congress approve the funding, they provided $8 million more than was requested.
Mueller and Chiaradio then hired C. Z.
(Sherry) Higgins, an experienced IT professional with 29 years of experience, to
create a new FBI unit: The Office of Program
Management. This new department would
serve as a central hub for expensive, complex, and risky projects (Marchewka, 2014).
In her new role, Higgins named Depew—
who had no formal IT experience—the
official VCF project manager (Goldstein,
2005). Depew became the primary point
of contact with the SAIC and served as a
liaison between the FBI’s investigative and
administrative processes divisions.
In March 2002, just two months after
hiring Higgins, Chiaradio left the FBI for a
lucrative role at BearingPoint Inc., a global
consulting firm (Verton, 2003). Depew
continued to hold JAD sessions throughout
the first half of 2002, resulting in a very
detailed VCF requirements document. The
VCF system would accept scanned documents and other electronic media, thereby
simplifying evidence tracking, and allow
individuals with proper clearance to access
that evidence from any FBI office location
(Goldstein, 2005). By summer 2002, SAIC
had approximately 200 programmers on
staff working on the VCF (Koman, 2006).
19
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Everyone seemed pleased with the progress being made. In a July 2002 senate
hearing, Higgins wowed the senators with
a PowerPoint presentation outlining the
VCF’s capabilities (U.S. Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 2002).
Unfortunately, despite appearances, the
VCF project was not on track. In August 2002
SAIC hired Matthew Patton to review design
documents outlining the VCF’s structure
and user interface. Patton, who had previously spent four years helping develop
a web-based database system used to plan
the Department of Defense’s $400 million
budget, quickly realized that the VCF’s
800-plus pages of requirements were too
complicated for effective implementation.
Patton asserted that SAIC was wasting time
coding unnecessary applications and was
making no attempts to control costs, for
example, they were using 200 programmers
where only a couple dozen were needed.
Patton asserted that “[t]he [SAIC’s] attitude was that it’s other people’s money, so
they’ll burn it every which way they want to”
(Koman, 2006). Patton did not feel that his
concerns were being taken seriously. Out
of frustration, Patton posted a message on
a public forum asserting that nobody at the
FBI was taking security issues seriously. This
post immediately got Higgins’ attention.
She labeled him a disgruntled employee
and reported him to the FBI’s security
division. His clearance was revoked. Unable
to continue work, he left his position three
months later.
In December 2002, Higgins asked
Congress for additional money, receiving
$123.2 million and increasing the total
cost of the Trilogy project to $581 million
(Kerzner, 2014). In 2003, SAIC began taking
change requests for software alterations
from the FBI. Approximately 300 change
requests were filed in 2003; SAIC implemented changes and delivered the final

VCF product in December 2003. Zalmai
Azmi, who was appointed interim CIO for
the FBI just weeks earlier, quickly realized
that the software was broken and unusable.
He made the decision to reject the VCF
based on 17 functional deficiencies. SAIC
argued that many of the deficiencies were
due to mid-project requirement changes.
In May 2004, Azmi asked SAIC if they
would change an electronic function of
the VCF into something he called the
Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in six
months for a fixed price of $16.4 million.
Additionally, in June 2004, the FBI hired
Aerospace Corporation to review the VCF
and determine if system requirements
were met. Aerospace found 59 issues and
sub issues arising from the FBI’s original
17 deficiencies; 19 were due to the FBI’s
requirement changes while the remaining
40 were SAIC problems (Marchewka, 2014).
As a result, SAIC offered to fix all issues if
given $56 million and an additional year to
work on the project. Funding to fix these
issues was never given, but the IOC was
developed. However, before work on the
IOC could be started, both Higgins and
Depew left the FBI.
4.1.3. Outcome
Completed in March 2005, the IOC was
partially successful. According to an internal
FBI assessment, “Although the IOC application was an aid to task management, its use
did not improve the productivity of most
users” (Marchewka, 2014, p. 8). After the
IOC launch, Mueller revealed to reporters
that the FBI was looking into off-the-shelf
software to meet their needs. In April 2005,
the VCF project was officially abandoned
(Kerzner, 2014). Commenting on the project, Senator Patrick Leahy asserted that
the “[VCF project has been a] train wreck
in slow motion, at a cost of $170 million to
American taxpayers and an unknown cost
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to public safety” (U.S. Senate Committee
on Appropriations, 2005).

4.2. HealthCare.gov
4.2.1. Context
Healthcare reform in the U.S. is an
oft-debated topic with wide-ranging implications. Throughout history, presidential
calls for healthcare reform have been met
with fierce opposition from the medical industry, for example, the American
Medical Association has long opposed
public insurance plans (Pear, 2009). In
the late 1960s, rising healthcare costs for
Medicare and Medicaid became a political
issue that would persist for decades. Over
the next five decades, other smaller yet
significant healthcare projects would be
passed, such as President Nixon’s Health
Maintenance Organization Act (HMO) in
1973, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act in 1974, COBRA (Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act), the
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act in 1988
(later repealed in 1989), and the Children’s
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) in 1997.
However, none of these programs provided
affordable healthcare and insurance for
the masses.
In 1993, President William J. Clinton began
an effort to enact a law for universal health
coverage using a “managed competition”
approach where insurers would compete
in tightly regulated markets. In the end,
President Clinton’s plan was unsuccessful because the health insurance industry
lobbied against healthcare reform and the

Republican opposition argued that reform
would be too costly for many businesses
(Nather, 2014). However, the CHIP was
enacted shortly thereafter; to date, over
seven million children have been insured
under the law.
The argument that the federal government should support healthcare accessibility resurfaced in public discussions
during the 2008 presidential election. After
assuming office in 2008, President Barack
H. Obama and members of Congress began
negotiating the terms of healthcare reform.
President Obama proposed a mandate that
would require all Americans to enroll in
an insurance plan of their choice. Despite
heavy Republican opposition, the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)
was passed by Congress in late 2009 and
signed into law by President Obama in
March 2010 (Dunham, 2010) (H.R. 3590).
Enacted with the goal of reducing healthcare costs and increasing health insurance
quality, the law expanded public and private
insurance coverage for the uninsured by
imposing mandates, subsidies, and insurance exchanges (Washington Post, 2013).
The ACA is the most significant regulatory overhaul of the U.S. healthcare systems since the passage of Medicare1 and
Medicaid2 in 1965.
4.2.2. The Project
After the ACA’s passage, planning, and
construction of HealthCare.gov was quickly
initiated and the launch date was set for
October 1, 2013, in time for the December
23, 2013 deadline for individuals to sign up
for coverage that would begin in January

Medicare is a national social insurance program, administered by the U.S. federal government since 1966,
that guarantees access to health insurance for Americans aged 65 and older who have worked and paid into
the system, and younger people with disabilities as well as people with end stage renal disease (Medicare.gov,
2012) and persons with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis.
2
Medicaid in the United States is a social health care program for families and individuals with low income
and resources.
1
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2014. Envisioned as the official marketplace
for health insurance, HealthCare.gov would
be a federally operated exchange for citizens
to shop for coverage. The Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) and the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) were responsible for implementing
key aspects of the law. This included the
development and certification of the insurance exchanges, determination of consumer eligibility for federal subsidies, and
construction of the HealthCare.gov website
(GAO-13-614, 2014). The website’s functionality would include digital identity authentication, income verification, and other forms
of data verification to determine insurance
plan eligibility (CMS, 2014). The goal was to
ambitiously roll out HealthCare.gov in a “big
bang” release involving the deployment of
all technology components at once instead
of incrementally (Thibodeau, 2013).
Development of the HealthCare.gov website occurred between 2010 and 2013. Under
the direction of the White House Office of
Health Reform, CMS and HHS contributed
to the implementation of the ACA in various
ways. CMS was primarily responsible for the
day-to-day development of HealthCare.gov
and served as the lead systems integrator
(LSI) for the various aspects of the project.
HHS’s Office of Health Reform was tasked
with ensuring that the project adhered to
the ACA’s rules and regulations.
Contractors and subcontractors were
also hired for specific tasks throughout
the project (Depilles, 2013). In May 2010,
the Canadian-based contractor CGI Federal
won a bid as lead contractor on the project
for $93.7 million. Over 55 other contractors
and subcontractors were hired during the
course of the project. Work was routinely
divided into smaller projects and given
to a contactor to complete. For example,
Quality Software Services, Inc. (QSSI), a
subcontractor of CGI Federal, developed
the Data Services Hub and the Enterprise

Identity Management System (EIDM) used
for HealthCare.gov (Yang, 2013). The
contractors also developed other pieces
of technology such as the user interface,
email notifications, registration confirmations, account activation links, and the
landing page for the website (Allison, 2013).
Moreover, various federal agencies, such
as the Internal Revenue Service and Social
Security Administration, were engaged as
well for purposes such as income and identity verification.
In May 2011, David Cutler, a Harvard
professor and former advisor on President
Obama’s 2008 Presidential campaign, sent a
memo to White House officials arguing that
an outside entity should be contracted to
oversee integration of the various components of HealthCare.gov (Washington Post,
2013). However, Cutler’s recommendation
went unheard—CMS would remain the
LSI (CBS News Staff, 2013). During the
next 18 months, CMS worked with individual contractors as they completed their
assigned tasks. As the 2012 presidential
election drew near, stakes became incredibly
high. President Obama was vying for reelection and Republican opposition was actively
lobbying against the ACA, despite the fact
that it had already been signed into law. The
White House, concerned that controversial plans or information might be leaked
to the media and used against President
Obama, instructed HHS employees not
to share “concepts of operation” or other
diagrams delineating the internal operations
of HealthCare.gov (Washington Post, 2013).
Furthermore, important insurance coverage
standards and rules were not released until
after the election (Washington Post, 2013).
As the October 1 launch of HealthCare.
gov neared, concerns began to arise that
the project would not be completed as
scheduled. In March 2013, HHS announced
that it would delay the rollout of small
business health exchanges by one year. A
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few weeks later, Henry Chao, deputy CIO
at CMS, said that he was “pretty nervous”
about the exchanges being ready by the
October 1 deadline at an insurance industry
meeting (Morgan & Hunter, 2013). Shortly
thereafter, more troubling news arose when
CGI Federal announced that they would
soon exceed their contract’s ceiling of $93.7
million. Additional funds not included in
the original contract were needed to avert
a cost overrun and improve system functionality. As a result, Congress approved
an additional $27.7 million in April 2013
(Morgan & Hunter, 2013).
In June 2013, the Gover nment
Accountability Office (GAO) released a
report on HealthCare.gov contending that
while “missed interim deadlines may not
affect implementation, additional missed
deadlines closer to the start of enrollment
could do so” (GAO-13-601, 2013, p. 1). The
GAO’s warning heightened pressure on
CMS, HHS, and contractors to succeed. In
July 2013, Serco was awarded a contract—
worth up to $1.25 billion—to handle paper
applications for exchange-based health
plans. Shortly after the contract was awarded, Britain's Serious Fraud Office (SFO)
began a criminal investigation into Serco
for fraud, resulting in more bad press for
HealthCare.gov (Murray, 2013).
In August 2013, CGI Federal sent a memo
to the CMS stating that only 55% of work
was completed (Washington Post, 2013).
Several weeks later, Congress approved an
additional $58 million in funding for CGI
Federal to ensure HealthCare.gov would
meet the October 1 deadline. The additional funds were justified as the need to add
new elements to the system and increase
capacity, but the GAO (2014) later found
that the additional funds were really to
continue the original development work.
As the launch date neared, it became clear
that there would not be sufficient time
to properly test all of HealthCare.gov’s

components. According to a September
2013 report, the top risk to the project was
“not enough time in schedule to conduct
adequate performance testing” (Johns &
Wolf, 2013). Increasing pressures resulted
in the approval of an additional $18.2 million in funding for CGI Federal just weeks
before launch (Morgan & Hunter, 2013).
On October 1, 2013, the day HealthCare.
gov launched, the site crashed almost
immediately. Issues were initially blamed
on higher-than-anticipated volumes of web
traffic. However, other problems were soon
uncovered, such as missing drop-down
tools, confusing instructions, and the
transmission of unnecessary data (AignerTreworgy, 2013). During the first week, the
site attracted 250,000 users simultaneously;
administration estimates were for 50–60,000
simultaneous users. It has been estimated
that only 1% of 3.7 million interested persons were able to enroll on the site during
its first week (Smith et al., 2013). For the 1%
that could access the site, they experienced
errors in price quotes, incorrect data transmitted to insurers, two days of data hub
outages during October, and verification
issues that prohibited enrollment.
4.2.3. Outcome
Following the failed deployment of
HealthCare.gov, the White House contracted with Quality Software Services, Inc.
(QSSI) to coordinate efforts to fix the website (Eilperin, 2014). In an interview with
Gerald Seib at the Wall Street Journal’s CEO
Council, President Obama acknowledged
that his administration underestimated the
complexities of building such a website and
also discussed the inefficiency of government procurement methods (Wall Street
Journal, 2013). President Obama vowed to
fix the site by late November and announced
that a “tech surge” approach would be
used, that is, experts from the public and
23
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private sector would be brought in to work
on the site until it was fixed (Mazmanian,
2014). The tech surge was largely effective; HealthCare.gov’s system uptime was
improved from an embarrassing low of 42%
on November 1 to 95% by early December
(Auerbach, 2013). However, enrollment was
lower than anticipated. While projections
anticipated 800,000 enrollees by December,
only 364,000 individuals had signed up
(Brennan, 2013). As a result, open enrollment, which was originally set to close on
December 23, 2013, was extended until
March 31, 2014. Nearly 8 million individuals had enrolled by the March deadline
(Galewitz, 2014).

4.3. National Health Service
(NHS)
4.3.1. Context
In the 1990s, Great Britain wanted to
modernize its health service. In 1992 a
strategy was put in place to enhance the
national health service including the development of electronic health records. The
strategy was called the NHS Information
Management and Technology (IM&T)
strategy (Wainwright & Waring, 2000;
Campion-Awwad et al., 2014). However,
“despite several technological advances and
the introduction of key infrastructure, the
strategy lacked overall objectives, specific
targets and sufficient programme evaluation” (Brown, 2001 as cited in CampionAwwad et al., 2014). The 1992 IM&T strategy
failed and was followed by the 1998 IM&T
strategy. The 1998 IM&T strategy also
failed. The reasons of the latter failure
were identified by Brown (2001, as cited
in Campion-Awwad et al., 2014) as “the lack
of identifiable performance targets, lack of
clear business case and lack of clarity about
plans to evaluate the success or failure of
the strategy.”

In the late 1990s, following these missed
opportunities, and after many discussions
at the government level, a private meeting
was held at 10 Downing Street on February
18, 2002 chaired by Prime Minister Tony
Blair and that included Microsoft CEO
Bill Gates (Campion-Awwad et al., 2014).
During this meeting, attendees agreed that
a centralized IT approach to Great Britain’s
National Health Service (NHS) was the best
solution to enable information and information systems to be better integrated and
linked with each other across Great Britain
(Collins, 2003). Following this meeting,
Great Britain’s National Programme for IT
(NPfIT) was launched by the NHS in June
2002 making it the largest public sector IT
project yet in the U.K., given its scope (the
five health authorities mentioned above)
and its budgeted overall cost of £6 billion.
The NPfIT was intended to create an online
portal that would allow citizens to access
personal health information such as test
results, x-rays, and summary care records
(Syal, 2013). The platform was supposed to
automate all patients’ health information
and enable patients and doctors to book
appointments, fill out electronic prescriptions, and otherwise share information.
4.3.2. The Project
The NPfIT started in June 2002 as a megascale, complex Health IT project that was
supposed to develop a unique integrated
system connecting patients through a digital
medical record with physicians, healthcare
facilities, pharmacies, and laboratories so
that medical practitioners would have access
to any patient’s health information anytime
anywhere. The NPfIT project was, due to
its public nature, in the public eye and part
of the political debate in the U.K. during
the duration of the project until it started
being dismantled in 2011. The press coverage continued for a few years after it was
officially stopped to report on the failure
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(Syal, 2013; Justinia, 2016), lessons learned
(Charette, 2012), the Fujitsu battle (Smith,
2014), among others. The NPfIT had many
stakeholders from patients and doctors to
politicians.
The NPfIT consisted of more than 300
hospitals and health institutions across
England. The project was divided into five
strategic health authority regions to facilitate the implementation: North East, North
West and West Midlands, Eastern, London,
and Southern clusters (Campion-Awwad
et al., 2014).
Early on, questions surrounding the complexity of the project, concerns regarding
the confidentiality of patients’ health information, the lack of consultation with key
stakeholders, and the need for a thorough
procurement phase were brought up by the
media (ComputerWeekly.com, 2007; 2008).
The U.K. National Audit Office (2008) also
reported on the fact that this mega-scale
public health IT project was more than an
IT project. It stressed that organizational
and cultural changes bound to accompany
this mega-scale project should be taken into
account for the project to be successful.
Campion-Awwad et al. (2014) discussed the
fact that healthcare professionals were not
included adequately in the development of
the project. The procurement phase lacked
clear conversations with healthcare professionals—future users of the systems. The
public officials and technology professionals
failed to understand the needs of the health
profession regarding implementing a digital
national health system. Future key users of
the NPfIT such as doctors, nurses, clinicians,
etc., were barely consulted about their
needs and their ideas on how to develop
the system. Instead, the government and
the technology companies under contract
took decisions based on what features they
thought should be part of the system. As
a result, the system was highly complex
and not user-friendly, making it difficult

for healthcare professionals to adapt and
to use. It became clear early on that users
did not feel committed to the NPfIT (Smith,
2011). Hendy, Reeves, Fulop, Hutchings, and
Masseria (2005) stated that the sociocultural
challenges in the implementation of the
NPfIT were as difficult as the technical and
logistical ones. The project experienced
several types of problems and concerns
that led to conflicts, delays, changes in
leadership, changes in suppliers, privacy
concerns, etc. For instance, there were
procurement concerns due to haste that
engendered overriding concerns, such
as values and communication (CampionAwwad et al., 2014). Further, concerns
started arising from patients on a national
scale that questioned the mandatory nature
of the NPfIT (Cross, 2006) and the confidentiality of their health information. Many
started to use their right to opt out of the
system and have their records shared among
health practitioners. One of the reasons
was the lack of information that patients
received on the sharing on how and which
information would be shared. Cross (2006)
stressed that one campaign was devoted to
reassuring patients on the security of their
health information especially on the fact
that such a centralized system with only
one access point to the patient’s record
was highly secured and any unauthorized
access would be detected right away. These
concerns became serious and generated
conflicts.
When the NPfIT was launched, vendors
were contracted to implement the project in
the various regions. Four technology companies (BT, Accenture, CSC, and Fujitsu)
were contracted to cover the five health
authority regions, which made interoperability challenging (Campion-Awwad et al.,
2014, pp. 20–21). They were hired based on
their qualifications to implement the system
quickly and not work on detailed specifications with the idea that details would
be handled as needed and not planned in
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advance (Smith, 2011). Richard Granger was
appointed Director General of the project in
September 2002. He had extensive consulting experience in public sector IT projects
and his previous position was at Deloitte
(Campion-Awwad et al., 2014). He made
it a point to go through the procurement
process as fast as possible. He managed
to set up all the contracts in about a year,
which is unusual for a public project of
such a scale (Smith, 2011). His implementation agenda was proven to be unrealistic
(Campion-Awwad et al., 2014). Handling the
procurement phase at this pace meant that
the requirements of the project were not
well understood and vendor choices not
always thought through. A few months into
the NPfIT, conflicts arose between NHS and
some vendors. Soon after, some vendors
started leaving the project. For example,
just over a year into the contract (in 2004),
British Telecom left, and Accenture/iSoft left
in 2006 (Sessions, 2008). Further, from early
on, there were issues between the NHS and
Fujitsu. In 2002, Fujitsu won the contract
to digitize medical records. Disagreement
appeared between the NHS and Fujitsu
soon afterwards about changes including a
new system for electronically displaying and
storing X-rays (Smith, 2011). After years of
disputes, the contract was fully terminated
in 2008. However, the disputes between
the government and Fujitsu did not end
in 2008 but continued until 2014 when
Fujitsu eventually won the battle in court
arbitration and was awarded about £400
million in compensation in addition to what
was already paid in the past (Smith, 2011).
Hendy et al. (2005) studied the implementation of the NPfIT early on and recommended that the NPfIT address four key
issues: 1) lack of trust of the stakeholders in
the success of the project; 2) the methodology for implementation; 3) the timetable for
implementation, which seemed unrealistic;
and 4) the need for better explanations of
the benefits of the project to the staff going

through the changes mentioned above,
as it was observed that rushing through
the procurement phase led to an unrealistic timetable that in turn started creating
doubts about the success of the project.
Also, key stakeholders were not consulted
on what their needs were when it came to
digitizing medical records. This generated
a lack of commitment to the project by the
medical profession and additionally many
patients started worrying about security and
privacy issues and decided to use their right
to opt out of the program. Campion-Awwad,
Hayton, Smith, and Vuaran (2014) identified
three main themes that can explain what
went wrong with the project: 1) haste, 2)
design, and 3) culture and skills (p. 3). Not
taking the time to think the project through
generated an unrealistic timetable, failure
to test the system, etc. The design of the
project made it difficult to recognize the
limitations of the project or confidentiality
issues inherent to a healthcare IT project.
Culture and skills means for instance that
there was no clear leadership, little or no
concern for privacy issues, etc.
4.3.3. Outcome
The NPfIT began dismantling in 2011 into
separate component parts and eventually
officially ended in 2013. The projected
cost was £6.4 billion; however, that cost
increased greatly due to poor planning. With
approximately £10 billion already spent on
the abandoned project, it created one of
the costliest project failures in the history
of ITs (Syal, 2013). Taxpayers continued to
pay transition and exit costs during 2013
and 2014.
More than a decade later, only one
small section of the intended use of the
NPfIT fully functions: the Summary Care
Records (SCR). An SCR is an electronic
record that centralizes key patients’ health
information. Currently, more than 94% of
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the population of England holds an SCR
that can be accessed by medical professionals twenty-four hours a day, seven days
a week. Further, since April 2015, all GPs
should offer their patients online access to
summary information of their GP records.
Other aspects of digitizing healthcare have
been redirected to local solutions. Further,
in April 2016, the NHS director of digital
technology Beverley Bryant confirmed that
contracts signed during the NPfIT and still
ongoing will be funded up to 2020 to enable
a better transition (McBeth, 2016).

biodiversity and the survival of the entire
ecosystem (Mills et al., 1993). We found
these roles are analogous to the roles of
stakeholders in the project ecosystem. We
will next discuss the role of each species
and its interactions with other species in
the ecosystem.
5.1.1. The Keystone Species: Public Agency

5.1. Species influencing
the success of each project
ecosystem

First and foremost, the public agency
is the “keystone species” of each project
ecosystem—the effective management of
which determines the direction of the entire
ecosystem (Purao & Desouza, 2010). The
literature on digital business ecosystems
suggests that in an ecosystem involving
multiple stakeholders, it is common for one
or more companies to act as the keystone
species of the ecosystem and take responsibility for setting the vision and direction for
all stakeholders to follow (Moore, 1993). In
the three cases, the public agencies assumed
the role of keystone species and failed in
this regard. Each project was initiated and
accelerated hastily due to a number of
political, social, and economic concerns.
Developers of HealthCare.gov worked feverishly to get the project underway and
developed. The project was born out of a
very divisive political fight about healthcare
reform that was still ongoing and snagged
with various legal challenges, political criticisms, and media attention. They had
only three years to interpret the law, gain
compliance from insurers, states, agencies,
and other stakeholders, delegate work to
contractors, and develop the website with
the knowledge that pushing the deadline
back was not an option.

In all three cases, several stakeholders
(species) levied significant influence on the
project outcome. Ecologists have assigned
roles to different species in an ecosystem,
e.g., the keystone species—the species
that is the most critical in maintaining the

The FBI’s intentions of improving their
systems were accelerated after September
11. Due to public fear for national security,
the FBI pressed on with contractors and
work plans that they knew were not working—all to maintain the image of being

5. FINDINGS
We make use of the rich amount of information collected on the three projects and
perform a comprehensive case analysis with
a bottom-up approach. When the ecosystem view is employed, researchers aim to
identify key actors and examine their interactions before drawing useful conclusions
(Karhu et al., 2009; Briscoe, 2010; Purao &
Desouza, 2010; Becker et al., 2011). Taking
the same approach, our first step for each
project was to identify and examine a list of
stakeholders and their interactions within
the ecosystem. After a thoroughly analysis
of each project ecosystem was conducted
indepdendently, we extracted common
issues that cut across the three mega-scale
IT projects and the ecosystems in which
they operated.
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productive. The hasty beginnings also
led to flawed implementation strategies.
Implementation strategies reflect an overall
agency plan on how to design, develop,
and execute a project. None of the projects had a strong implementation strategy,
which was the reason for so much risk and
waste. For instance, the NPfIT procurement
phase was rushed through, which led to a
misunderstanding of the requirements of
the different stakeholders. In addition to
the initial setup of the ecosystem, as the
keystone species the public agencies also
carry the duty of monitoring the state of
the ecosystem, especially, performance
of other species such as the ecosystem
engineers (contractors). As illustrated in
the next section, the agencies in these
cases often failed to monitor and respond
to underperforming contractors.
5.1.2. Ecosystem Engineers: Contractors
Contracting is the most important way
that the government outsources work (Dille
& Söderlund, 2013). The contractors are the
“ecosystems engineers” of each project ecosystem that are responsible for building the
ecosystem environment (Purao & Desouza,
2010). For the three projects, contractor
relations contributed greatly to project failure. In the case of the ACA, the project was
deeply fragmented. For instance, Northrop
Grumman, Deloitte LLP, SAIC Inc., Rand
Corporation, General Dynamics, Booz Allen
Hamilton, MITRE Corporation, Vangent, and
PriceWaterhouseCoopers all won contracts
with the government to develop pieces of
HealthCare.gov. The fragmented nature of
development was not entirely the contractors’ fault. Employees at CMS decided to
take on roles such as lead integrator of
software, a role traditionally contracted
to an experienced business. Efforts were
made haphazardly by many contractors
and without sufficient guidance or access
from CMS and HHS. These efforts were

detrimental to the working relationships
between the contractors and agencies as
well as to the outcome of HealthCare.gov.
CMS’ relation with their contractors was
inconsistent throughout. Some contractors
received contracts to build significant portions of the website, but lacked access to
critical information because public agency
leadership failed to provide it.
In order to implement NPfIT the British
Labor Department for Health signed
contracts with four main vendors: British
Telecom, Fujitsu, CSC and Accenture. The
vendors were divided by clusters and by
projects and were in charge of projects that
were spread out on one or more clusters.
For instance, British Telecom was in charge
of the implementation for London cluster
services (Campion-Awwad et al., 2014). The
vendors were chosen because of their ability
to expedite the procurement process at the
request of the head of the program (Smith,
2011), which soon caused problems: the
requirements were not well-defined and the
choices based on those requirements were
not fully thought through. The haste in the
procurement phase did not allow for proper
communication and consultation with the
hospitals, clinicians and patients who were
to eventually become the end users of the
NPfIT (Campion-Awwad et al., 2014).
In order to implement the VCF, the bureau
chose two different contractors: DynCorp
and the Science Applications International
Corp (SAIC). The task orders were awarded under the Millennia contract, an IT
services vehicle overseen by the General
Services Administration (GSA), and set on
a three-year time frame (Emery, 2001). In
the wake of the September 11 attacks, FBI
director Mueller instructed the project to
be put into overdrive and completed “as
soon as technically possible” (Marchewka,
2014). This resulted in the project being
placed on an accelerated 22-month timeframe. SAIC agreed to deliver the system
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by December 2003 and DynCorp agreed
to deliver hardware by July 2002. However,
DynCorp didn’t deliver until April 2004 due
to difficulties migrating email networks off
legacy systems. SAIC delivered an initial
VCF system on time, but it was riddled with
deficiencies. SAIC’s inability to correct such
errors, combined with a recommendation
to the project leaders from an independent
reviewer (Aerospace Corp.) to pursue a
commercial off-the-shelf solution, led to
official project termination in April 2006.
In all three cases, as the ecosystem
engineers, the contractors struggled to
achieve an accurate estimation of the
amount of “engineering” they will need to
perform for the ecosystem. Underestimation
of the work required lead directly to the
contractors’ inability to deliver their components of the system on time, on budget,
and on scope.
5.1.3. Specialist: Politicians
and Legislatures
Politicians are officials elected to represent their constituents. They include the
president, the prime minister, governors,
and members of federal and state legislatures. Their role in all three projects was
specific and significant, representing a
specialist species—a species occupying a
unique ecological niche in the ecosystem.
Politicians, especially through the power of
the legislatures, leveraged their influence
and political capital on other stakeholders
in the development of each project. For
the ACA and HealthCare.gov, initiating the
project was a monumental and highly divisive political process. The president set the
healthcare reform agenda and guided the
development of the ACA while members of
Congress actively debated for or against the
new law. For the VCF, the decision to initiate
the Trilogy Project was largely an internal
decision. Politicians did not truly enter

the fray until after 9/11 and passage of the
PATRIOT Act, when significant efforts were
underway to secure the country’s safety. By
that time, the FBI had already developed its
project but the VCF was given more “teeth”
by its political supporters. For the British
government, the decision to initiate the
NPfIT came from a need to reform an outdated healthcare system with the promise
to make it one of the most sophisticated
paperless systems in the world.
Politicians also helped to create political
overtones that drove each case’s narrative. For the ACA, two factions of Congress
emerged during the developmental stages
of HealthCare.gov: one faction was adamantly opposed to the ACA and sought to
have it defunded, and another wanted to
see the ACA move forward. The rhetoric
surrounding the law shaped much of the
narrative of the ACA and HealthCare.gov.
This narrative was largely one of mistrust
and too much government power (Le,
2013). For the NPfIT, many politicians
viewed the decision as rushed and as a
campaigning tool for the next elections for
Tony Blair (Campion-Awwad et al., 2014).
The meeting held at 10 Downing Street on
February 18, 2002 chaired by Prime Minister
Tony Blair and that led to the decision to
launch the NPfIT is reported to have lasted
90 minutes and not to have addressed past
issues encountered in public health IT projects (for instance the 1992 and 1998 IM&T
failed strategies) at their core but rather to
choose to impose an unwelcome change to
the health system (Campion-Awwad et al.,
2014). Conversely, for the VCF, the tone was
considerably more supportive and patriotic. Congressional voices like then-Senator
Joe Biden (D-DE) offered context for the
law the day before it passed, stating in an
October 25, 2011 press release that “[t]he
anti-terrorism bill allows law enforcement
to keep up with the modern technology
these terrorists are using.” The tenor of
discussion left no room for alternatives, and
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the FBI’s Virtual Case Files project found
itself positioned in the early stages of an
overhaul with a congress that could not
support its mission more strongly.
In each case, the politicians and legislatures focused primarily on one dimension
of their role of specialists: the policy dimension, i.e., setting the rules for governance
and interactions among species in the
ecosystem. However, they overlooked or
ignored the other crucial dimension of their
speciality: the monitoring and evaluating
dimension. Once the initial setup of the
ecosystem is completed, they failed to monitor how those logical ideas, regardless of
political support, were being implemented
throught the various administrative actions
around the IT projects.
5.1.4. Specialist: Media Outlets
Media outlets occupy another unique
niche in the project ecosystem. They
are not immediately responsible for the
success of the ecosystem, yet they perform the crucial task of monitoring and
broadcasting the system’s health. Through
the published news reports and stories,
the media had direct influences on the
way members of these projects chose to
act. Throughout the development and
implementation of the ACA, the media
published a breadth of stories. Some were
rigorous and provided non-partisan factual information, while others reported
biased information driven by political
agendas. For instance, in February 2014,
the nonpartisan Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) released a report on the
ACA entitled “Labor Market Effects of the
Affordable Care Act” where they projected that there would be a reduction of
hours worked by individuals resulting in
the decline of full-time-equivalent workers of about 2.0 million in 2017, rising to
about 2.5 million in 2024 (Congressional

Budget Office, 2014). Most media outlets
initially misreported the story by zeroing
in on the part about the reduction in the
workforce, but failing to mention that the
CBO’s projected findings were tied to the
chosen number of hours worked, rather
than a representation of actual job losses.
While some outlets corrected their misreported stories to state the true nature of
the CBO’s report after they realized their
inaccurate reporting, others maintained
the same misrepresentative claim (Gold,
2014). For NPfIT, the media started reporting more on the project when problems
started arising a few months into the project, informing that vendors started to
leave or that confidentiality concerns were
brought to attention (Campion-Awwad et
al., 2014). For the VCF, the FBI’s image
was tarnished prior to the initiation of the
Trilogy project. The September 11 attacks
directed a flurry of media attention at the
bureau. The FBI’s inability to effectively
share basic information became more and
more of a problem. Criticism continued
throughout the implementation of the
Trilogy project. The media was once again
critical when the VCF was abandoned in
2005. An article in The Washington Post
asserted that the VCF’s failure “stemmed
from failures of almost every kind, including poor conception and muddled execution of the steps needed to make the
system work, according to outside reviews
and interviews with people involved in the
project” (Eggen & Witte, 2006).
5.1.5. Natives: Citizens
Citizens are the highly influential voting
populace that elect politicians, view the
media, advocate through their actions,
and pay taxes, who ultimately fund the
public sector IT projects. As the permanent
residents of the geographic region these
public IT projects aim to serve, citizens
are the native species of the ecosystem.
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Public sentiment can change the direction
of the project at any time. First, as project
stakeholders, citizens were activists or supporters. In the case of the ACA, activists in
favor of and opposition to the bill included
nonprofits, think tanks, political action
groups, lobbyists, wealthy citizens with high
political influence, and insurers. Activists not
in favor of the ACA, for example, Charles
and David Koch—known popularly as the
Koch brothers—spent a significant amount
of their money and political capital to repeal
and defund the law (Schouten, 2013). For
the VCF, citizens were vocal about wanting
more security post 9/11, but few mentioned
the VCF directly.
Second, citizens as taxpayers had an
expectation that their tax dollars were being
used efficiently and effectively. Citizens

are “the public” that stakeholders such as
politicians and the media work so hard to
persuade. Efforts through the news, social
media, and commercials were all made to
sway public opinion. For the NPfIT as the
project escalated, the media started writing
about the concerns emerging from the
management of the NPfIT. Citizens became
aware of the problems and of the monetary
impact of the project escalation.
The following diagram (see Figure 2
below) illustrates the interactions and
inter-relationships among the species of
the project ecosystems, with the keystone
species (public agency) at the center stage.
Each arrow in the diagram represents the
resources and information one stakeholder
provides to another, and/or the influence it
has on the other stakeholder. These flows of

Figure 2: Species and Interactions within a Mega-scale Public Sector IT
Project Ecosystem.
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resources and information capture the most
crucial interactions among these species.

5.2. Major failures in the project
ecosystem
Building on the analysis of the events that
unfolded and stakeholders’ actions taken
during each project ecosystem’s failure, we
extracted several major issues common to
the three projects that contributed to the
failure. The first few issues revolve around
the public agencies’ failure as keystone
species for the project ecosystems.
5.2.1. Failures in the public agency’s
performance of the role of keystone species
Failure in hiring key personnel with
proper knowledge and experience
From the perspective of knowledge
management, a large IT project embodies
a network of individuals that transfer and
exchange explicit and tacit knowledge for
the benefit of the organization (Briscoe,
2010; Li et al., 2012). Effective flow of
knowledge within the ecosystem requires
highly qualified individuals occupying certain positions to serve as key nodes in the
network (Briscoe, 2010). The three cases
demonstrated that the failure of the projects
could be partially attributed to dysfunction
in the knowledge ecosystem. The cases
exemplified several instances where the
expertise of underqualified individuals was
scaled up to fit the size and scope of the
project. For instance, HealthCare.gov had
leaders and managers that were highly
regarded in matters of health reform and
public administration but not the required
technological knowledge.
In these projects, leaders did not seek
out advice from the experts within the IT
departments of their own organizations
when making technology decisions, even

when they weren’t equipped to make such
decisions. The decision to serve as the lead
systems integrator for the entire HealthCare.
gov website was a poor choice made by
CMS and HHS. After the project collapsed,
the tech surge was proof positive that,
internally, neither agency had the expertise
to adequately manage the project. For the
FBI, once the VCF was a known failure,
there were reports of the FBI’s continued
mid-stream project modifications and continued acceptance of missed deadlines and
cost overruns. For the NPfIT, the haste
with which the implementers wanted to
conduct the project led to rushed decisions
without sufficient consultation of experts
and stakeholders.
Failure in responding to early signals
alerting the impending implosion of
the project ecosystem
Detecting early warning signals of an
impending collapse of a natural ecosystem
has been a persistent yet elusive goal for
scientists (Carpenter et al., 2011). There
are usually indications of impending failures that can be detected before the failure
occurs (Purao et al., 2012) that should enable
the organization to intervene to prevent
or minimize the damage. Bartis and Mitev
(2008) showed that different stakeholders
have different interpretations of a system
during the implementation phases which
leads to different problems because success or failure of the project is understood
differently by the stakeholders. In the case
of the three projects, the projects were in
crisis well before they failed. Unfortunately,
the projects had no contingency plans. The
implosion occurred when there were little
to no appropriate actions to remedy the
failures. Hensgen et al. (2003) note the
importance of staying alert to crisis signs
and signals in a project in order to allow for
“self-correction” (p. 193). They identify two
types of signals that would alert managers
to crisis: mechanical alarms, which are
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technological triggers, and human technology, which are organizational personnel that
alert organizations to problems.
In the case of HealthCare.gov, human
technology would be the signalers of crisis. The teams assigned to HealthCare.gov
were wrapped up in projects they were ill
equipped to handle. Arguably, the teams
had a fear of signaling the crisis flag due
to external constraints. The short window
of time, many moving parts, and extreme
political pressure on HHS and CMS were
palpable. Some individuals involved could
see what was coming, but there was no time
to stop it unless the website launch was
pushed back. In the case of NPfIT, human
technology would also raise the alarm to
problems. In 2008, the National Audit Office
alerted that for the project to succeed, NHS
needed, in addition to the technology in
place, to change its organizational culture.
This suggested approach, which was more
socio-technical, was not adopted. Another
signal occurred when in 2004, conflicts
between two of the contractors, Fujitsu and
British Telecom, could not be resolved and
they both left the NPfIT project just after
over a year into the project. The VCF project
team continually allowed the contractor to
push back due dates. There were instances
of the project development team holding up
progress. There is no evidence of anyone
acting rationally enough to create a human
technology alert sufficiently loud to substantively help the project. However, just having
a human technology signaler wouldn’t have
been enough. There were ample warnings
from the state of the software for each project that should have let leaders know that
the projects were heading toward failure.
5.2.2. Flawed relationships among species
in the project ecosystem
The interactions and inter-relationships
among stakeholders are a defining

characteristic of an ecosystem. Dysfunctional
relationships among key species or stakeholders in any ecosystem could trigger the
collapse of the system.
Severely flawed relationships
between the public agency and
contractors
Considering public agencies’ dependence
on contractors to carry out the actual development tasks, the relationships with the
contractors are arguably one of the most
critical in the ecosystem (Dille & Söderlund,
2013). In the three cases, the relationships
with contractors were severely flawed in
unique ways. For example, the relationship
between HealthCare.gov contractors can
be best described as fragmented contractor management. Due to the infighting
within CMS and HHS, there were various
controls driving contractor relationships
and decision-making, making contractor
guidance inconsistent. For the NPfIT, two
contractors left the project a year or so
after the project started. The relationships
were not managed properly until it was
too late. The FBI was still brainstorming
ideas throughout the project and the VCF
contractors were given too much latitude to
perform unnecessary work and miss deadlines. The FBI was locked into a contract
that greatly benefitted their contractors
when holdups happened. For instance,
the FBI’s contracts also stipulated that if
the project time frame was lengthened
or the contractor incurred unforeseen or
additional costs, the FBI would pay those
costs too (Goldstein, 2005).
Flawed relationship between the
legislature and the public agency
By providing funding to the public agency
for a public IT project, the legislature serves
as the direct source of resources for the
ecosystem. It is known to ecologists that a
natural ecosystem starved of resources can
fail; on the other hand, an overabundance of
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certain resources can also lead to a disaster.
What we have observed in these projects
exhibits the same relationship: both the
severe overfunding and underfunding of
a large public IT project can contribute to
its problems.
HealthCare.gov had significant money
issues, as the ACA was underfunded for
political reasons. The Congressional Budget
Office projected it would cost between
$5 billion and $10 billion to implement
the law. HHS only received $1 billion for
general implementation work. The NPfIT
was initially granted the £6.4 projected cost
and ended up costing £10 by the time it was
abandoned. For the FBI, Congress approved
$379.8 million to be spent over three years
and then approved an additional $201.2
million as the project stretched to five years,
increasing the project cost to $581 million
(Kerzner, 2014). The overfunding and the
underfunding reflect the strong hold that
legislature can place on a project. In the
three situations, the effects were damning
and contributed to failure.

6. DISCUSSION
6.1. Limitations
As with any research that builds on analysis of specific cases, the generalizability
of the findings is limited, considering the
unique settings of the three projects investigated. The three projects are components
of a nationwide IT initiative in an Englishspeaking country. Additional insights are
needed regarding the success or failure
of mega-scale IT projects in other areas
of public interest (e.g., public education,
national security, etc.), at different governmental levels, under different political and
cultural contexts.

The methodology also limits our ability to
assess the strength of relationships among
specific research constructs or make any
causal inferences. Statistical analysis of a
larger sample of similar projects would be
required for such purposes. Additionally,
the present study only utilized information
publicly available on the three projects.
While the public sources provided sufficient
data for our analysis of the three failed
projects, first-hand data (e.g., interviews
with key managers) would undoubtedly
enrich our understandings of the internal
struggles during project implosion.

6.2. Concluding remarks and
suggestions for further research
The three mega-scale public sector IT
projects studied in this research proved
themselves to be complex ecosystems.
These three projects operated in different
ecosystems, for example, supportive vs.
hostile ecosystems. This key distinction
could imply that these projects should
have seen different outcomes based on the
ecosystem attributes, for example, it could
be argued that a project conducted in a
supportive ecosystem would see a more
successful outcome. Yet, as we show in this
paper, they all suffered from similar issues
that led to project failure. One similarity
shared by the three projects is that the
issues were on the extremes. For instance,
whether too much funding or too little, too
much scrutiny/support or too little. These,
being extremes, challenged and put the
ecosystem out of balance, which in turn
impacted the IT project.
Our findings further demonstrated that
these projects shared significant characteristics with natural ecosystems with flawed
interactions among species. When megascale IT projects are being developed, a
variety of stakeholders engage with one
another, such as contractors, lawmakers, the
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public, the media, and public employees, to
create the project outcome. When failure
occurs, it is an outward manifestation of the
inability of the public agency to perform its
role as keystone species for the ecosystem,
and flawed relationships between the public
agency with other species in the ecosystem.
Our study also contributes to the project
management literature by providing further
evidence supporting the notion that environmental factors exert critical influence
on large-scale inter-institutional IT projects
(Kadefors, 1995; Engwall, 2003; Dille &
Söderlund, 2011).

for example, the importance of filling key
positions with personnel with sufficient
technical expertise. However, as dynamics
change and the level of technology intensifies, further research is needed. In particular, insights into the internal dynamics
of the project team within a public agency
will lead to practical guidelines for managing a large public IT project, and insights
into better theorization, policy guidelines,
frameworks, and cases to be used for educational purposes.

Our study suggests several directions
for future research. There exists an almost
infinite number of natural ecosystems vastly
different from each other. Likewise, largescale IT projects vary on many dimensions,
such as those discussed in the introduction.
Further, projects could be originated by
different levels of government, and require
different levels of technological intensity.
Additional studies of cases under different
settings—of both failed projects and successful ones—will help build knowledge
around different types of IT project ecosystems that vary in their ability to react
to crises. The exploratory explanations
for public IT project failures we proposed
should be further developed into research
models with testable hypotheses and operationalization of constructs, and verified
empirically.

REFERENCES

In our application of the ecosystem view,
we generally take a holistic view of the
public agencies while focusing on their
interactions with stakeholders external
to the agencies. Within a public agency, a
multitude of self-interested actors form a
network of interactions, creating complex
dynamics that impact the outcome of the
project (Dille & Söderlund, 2011; Janssen
et al., 2015). Our discovery includes useful
observations and suggestions regarding
internal project management practices,

The Washington Post (2013, November 2), A
timeline of the affordable care act, retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/a-timeline-of-the-affordable-careact/2013/11/02/76b6f9b6-43f9-11e3-a751f032898f2dbc_story.html
Aigner-Treworgy, A. (2013, November 15), Engineers: HealthCare.gov better, but initial
problems persist, retrieved October 29, 2014,
from http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/15/politics/
obamacare-engineers/
Allison, B. (2013, October 9), Good enough for
government work? The contractors building
Obamacare, retrieved from http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/10/09/aca-contractors
Altheide, D. L. (1996), Qualitative Media Analysis: Qualitative Research Method Series.
(Vol. 38), Thousand Oaks, California: Sage
Publications, Inc.
Associated Press (2001, June 20), FBI got conflicting advice on what to save, retrieved from
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2001-05-15-mcveigh-fbi.htm
Auerbach, D. (2013, December 2), Healthcare.
gov: No Longer a Total Disaster!, retrieved
from http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/
bitwise/2013/12/healthcare_gov_nov_30_deadline_the_tech_surge_is_working.html
Bartis, E., & Mitev, N. (2008). “A multiple narrative approach to information systems failure:

35

PublishedSIM02-2018_article01.indd
by AIS Electronic Library 35
(AISeL), 2018

16/07/2018 12:19

27

Systèmes d'Information et Management, Vol. 23 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 2

SYSTÈMES D’INFORMATION ET MANAGEMENT

a successful system that failed”, European
Journal of IS (EJIS), vol. 17, n°2, p.112–124.
Becker, J., Dai, R. W., & Purao, S. (2011), “Understanding IT project risks as disturbances
to digital ecosystems”, Proceedings of the
International Conference on Management of
Emergent Digital EcoSystems, San Francisco,
California.
Big Bang Boom (2014), retrieved March 2, 2016,
from The Standish Group International website: https://www.standishgroup.com/sample_
research_files/BigBangBoom.pdf
Bozeman, B. (2002), “Public-value failure: When
efficient markets may not do”, Public Administration Review, p. 145–161.
Bozeman, B., & Bretschneider, S. (1986), “Public
management information systems: Theory
and prescription”, Public Administration
Review, p. 475–487.
Brennan, P. (2013), 137,000 People Have Selected
Plans on HealthCare.gov, Most of Them Can’t
Get Subsidies, retrieved from http://www.
nationalreview.com/corner/366070/undefined
Briscoe, G. (2010), “Complex Adaptive Digital
EcoSystems”, Proceedings of the International
Conference on Management of Emergent
Digital EcoSystems, Bangkok, Thailand.
Brouwer, G. E. Victorian Parliament, Victorian
Ombudsman (2011), Own motion investigation into ICT-enabled projects: In consultation with the Victorian Auditor-General,
retrieved from Victorian Government Printer
website: https://www.ombudsman.vic.gov.au/
getattachment/d5e69dd1-400d-42cd-a5709c6b21c4bb1e//reports-publications/parliamentary-reports/own-motion-investigation-into-ict-enabled-projects.aspx
Brown, T. (2001), “Modernisation or failure? IT
development projects in the UK public sector,”
Financial Accountability & Management,
vol. 17, n° 4, p. 363–381.
Carpenter, S. R., Cole, J. J., Pace, M. L., Batt, R.,
Brock, W. A., Cline, T., & Weidel, B. (2011),
“Early warnings of regime shifts: a whole-ecosystem experiment”, Science, vol. 332 n°6033,
p. 1079–1082.
CBS News Staff (2001), Former agents hit FBI
on McVeigh was evidence that could have

helped McVeigh ignored by FBI? [Television
series episode]. In 60 MINUTES. New York
City: CBS, retrieved from http://www.cbsnews.
com/news/former-agents-hit-fbi-on-mcveigh/
CBS News Staff (2013), Obamacare: Memo reveals health care adviser warned W.H. was
losing control 3 years ago, retrieved from
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obamacarememo-reveals-health-care-adviser-warnedwh-was-losing-control-3-years-ago/
CNN Poll (2013), CNN Poll: Obama approval
falls amid controversies, retrieved from http://
politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2013/06/17/cnnpoll-obama-approval-falls-amid-controversies/
Collins, T. (2003), “How the national programme
came to be the health service’s riskiest IT project”, Computer Weekly, 9/16/2003, p. 20–24.
Campion-Awwad, O., Hayton, A., Smith, L. and
Vuaran, M. (2014), “The National Programme
for IT in the NHS: A Case History”, MPhil Public
Policy, University of Cambridge.
Cats-Baril, W., & Thompson, R. (1995). “Managing information technology projects in the
public sector”, Public Administration Review,
p. 559-566.
Charette, R.N. (May 2012), “Lessons From the
UK NPfIT Debacle Still Being Learned”, IEEE
Spectrum.
Congressional Budget Office (2014), Labor
Market Effects of the Affordable Care Act:
Updated Estimates, retrieved from http://
www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/45010-breakout-AppendixC.pdf
Cross, M. (2006), “Keeping the NHS electronic
spine on track”, The British Medical Journal,
p. 332–656, retrieved from http://www.bmj.
com/content/332/7542/656
D’Andrea, A., Ferri, F., Grifoni, P., & Guzzo, T.
(2009), “Analysing the evolution of a Digital
Organization Eco-Systems (DOES)”, Proceedings of the International Conference on
Management of Emergent Digital EcoSystems,
Lyon, France.
Depilles, L. (2013, October 16), Meet CGI Federal, the company behind the botched launch
of HealthCare.gov, retrieved from http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/

36

SIM02-2018_article01.indd 36
https://aisel.aisnet.org/sim/vol23/iss2/2

16/07/2018 12:19

28

Fagnot et al.: Unpacking complexities of mega-scale public sector information te

UNPACKING COMPLEXITIES OF MEGA-SCALE PUBLIC SECTOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS

wp/2013/10/16/meet-cgi-federal-the-companybehind-the-botched-launch-of-healthcare-gov/
Desouza, K. C. (2015), “Creating a Balanced
Portfolio of Information Technology Metrics,” Washington: IBM Center for The BusinessGovernment, retrieved from http://
www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/
files/Creating%20a%20Balanced%20Portfolio%20of%20Information%20Technology%20
Metrics.pdf.
Dille, T., & Söderlund, J. (2011), “Managing
inter-institutional projects: The significance
of isochronism, timing norms and temporal
misfits,” International Journal of Project
Management, vol. 29, p. 480–490.
Dille, T., & Söderlund, J. (2013), “Managing temporal misfits in institutional environments: A
study of critical incidents in a complex public
project”, International Journal of Managing
Projects in Business, vol.6, n°3, p. 552–575.
Dunham, W. (2010, March 22), Timeline: Milestones in Obama's quest for healthcare reform,
REUTERS, retrieved from http://www.reuters.
com/article/2010/03/22/us-usa-healthcare-timeline-idUSTRE62L0JA20100322
Eggen, D., & Witte, G. (2006, August 18), The
FBI's upgrade that wasn't, retrieved from http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2006/08/17/AR2006081701485.html
Eilperin, J. (2014, January 14), QSSI to stay
on as HealthCare.gov’s general contractor,
retrieved October 29, 2014, from http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/
wp/2014/01/14/qssi-to-stay-on-as-healthcaregovs-general-contractor/
Emery, G. R. (2001, June 13), SAIC Wins Part of
FBI Trilogy Project, retrieved from http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2001/06/13/
saic-wins-part-of-fbi-triology-project.aspx
Engwall, M. (2003), “No project is an island:
linking projects to history and context,” Research Policy, vol. 32, n°5, p. 789–808.
Executive Office of the President, Office of
Management & Budget (2015), Fiscal Year
2016 Budget of the U.S. Government (paper),
United States Government Printing Office.
Flyvbjerg, B. (2005), Design by deception: The
politics of megaproject approval, Harvard

Design Magazine, 22, 50–59, retrieved from
http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/HARVARDDESIGN63PRINT.pdf
Flyvbjerg, B. (2009), “Survival of the unfittest:
why the worst infrastructure gets built – and
what we can do about it,” Oxford Review of
Economic Policy, vol. 25, n°3, p. 344–367,
doi: 10.1093/oxrep/grp024
Flyvbjerg, B. (2014), "What You Should Know
about Megaprojects and Why: An Overview,"
Project Management Journal, vol. 45, n°2,
April–May, 6–19, DOI:10.1002/pmj.21409
Flyvbjerg, B., Budzier, A. (2009), “Why your IT
project may be riskier than you think”, Harvard Business Review, retrieved from
https://hbr.org/2011/09/why-your-it-project-maybe-riskier-than-you-think/
Flyvbjerg, B., Bruzelius, N., & Rothengatter, W.
(2003). Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy
of Ambition, Cambridge University Press.
Galewitz, P. (2014, May 1), Healthcare.gov Finished Strong Despite Rocky Start, Enrollment
Data Show, retrieved from http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/healthcare-gov-finished-strongdespite-rocky-start-enrollment-data-show/Gauld, R. (2007), “Public sector information
system project failures: Lessons from a New
Zealand hospital organization”, Government Information Quarterly, vol. 24, n°1,
p. 102–114.
Grabher, G. (2002), “The project ecology of
advertising: Tasks, talents and teams”, Regional Studies, vol. 36, n°3, p. 245–262. doi:
10.1080/0034340022012205
Goldstein, A., & Eilperin, J. (2013, November 2),
HealthCare.gov: How political fear was pitted
against technical needs, The Washington Post,
retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/challenges-have-dogged-obamashealth-plan-since-2010/2013/11/02/453fba42426b-11e3-a624-41d661b0bb78_story.html
Goldstein, H. (September 2005), “Who Killed the
Virtual Case File: How the FBI Blew More than
100 Million on Case-Management Software
It Will Never Use”, IEEE Spectrum, p. 1-16.
Han, S. H., Yun, S., Kim, H., Kwak, Y. H., Park, H.
K., & Lee, S. H. (2009), “Analyzing schedule
delay of mega project: Lessons learned from

37

PublishedSIM02-2018_article01.indd
by AIS Electronic Library 37
(AISeL), 2018

16/07/2018 12:19

29

Systèmes d'Information et Management, Vol. 23 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 2

SYSTÈMES D’INFORMATION ET MANAGEMENT

Korea train express”, IEEE Transactions on
Engineering Management, vol. 56, n°2, p.
243–256.
Hendy, J., Reeves, B.C., Fulop. N., Hutchings,
A. and Masseria, C. (2005), “Challenges to
implementing the national programme for
information technology (NPfIT): a qualitative
study”, British Medical Journal, vol. 331,
n°7512, p. 331–336.
Hensgen, T., Desouza, K. C., & Kraft, G. D. (2003),
“Games, signal detection, and processing in
the context of crisis management”, Journal
of Contingencies and Crisis Management,
vol. 11, n°2, p. 67–77.
Hodgson, D. and Cicmil,S. (2008), “The other
side of projects: The case for critical project
studies”, International Journal of Managing
Projects in Business, vol. 1, n°1, p. 142-152.
Holling, C. S. (1973). “Resilience and stability of
ecological systems”, Annual Review of Ecology
and Systematics, vol. 4, p. 1– 24.
House Hearing, 108 Congress (2004), retrieved
from
h t t p : / / w w w. g p o . g o v / f d s y s / p k g / C H R G 108hhrg93550/html/CHRG-108hhrg93550.htm
Janssen, M., van der Voort, H., & van Veenstra, A.
F. (2015), “Failure of large transformation projects from the viewpoint of complex adaptive
systems: Management principles for dealing
with project dynamics”, Information Systems
Frontiers, vol. 17, n°1, p. 15–29.
Johns, J., & Wolf, B. (2013, October 30), First on
CNN: Obama administration warned about
healthcare website. CNN Politics, retrieved
from http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/politics/
obamacare-warning/
Justinia, T. (2016), “The UK's National Programme
for IT: Why was it dismantled?,” Health Services Management Research, vol. 30, n°1,
p. 2-9.Kadefors, A. (1995), “Institutions in
building projects: implications for flexibility
and change”, Scandinavian Journal of Management, vol. 11, n°4, p. 395–408.
Karhu, K., Botero, A., Vihavainen, S., Tang, T., &
Hämäläinen, M. (2009), “A Digital Ecosystem
for Boosting User-Driven Service Business”,
Proceedings of the International Conference

on Management of Emergent Digital EcoSystems, Lyon, France.
Kerzner, H. (2014), Project Recovery: Case Studies and Techniques for Overcoming Project
Failure, Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc.
Kirschvink, J. L. (2000), “Earthquake prediction
by animals: Evolution and sensory perception”, Bulletin of the Seismological Society
of America, vol. 90, n°2, p. 312–323.
Koman, R. (2006, August 18), SAIC deserves big
share of blame for trilogy, ZDNet Government,
retrieved from http://www.zdnet.com/blog/
government/saic-deserves-big-share-of-blamefor-trilogy/2518
Koenig, G. (2012), “Business Ecosystems Revisited”, Management (France), vol. 15, p.
208-224.
Lamb, R., King, J. L., & Kling, R. (2003), “Informational environments: Organizational contexts
of online information use”, Journal of the
American Society for Information Science
and Technology, vol. 54, n°2, p. 97–114.
Le T. P. (2013), “Affordable Care Act and the scope
of federal power”, Washington Lawyer, retrieved from http://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/
publications/washington-lawyer/articles/january-2013-affordable-care-act.cfm
Li, W., Badr, Y., & Biennier, F. (2012), “Digital ecosystems: challenges and prospects”,
Proceedings of the International Conference
on Management of Emergent Digital EcoSystems, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Marchewka, J. T. (2014), “The FBI virtual case
file: A case study”, Communications of the
IIMA, vol. 10, n°2, p. 1.
Maughan, A. (2010), Six reasons why the NHS
National Programme For IT failed, retrieved from http://www.computerweekly.com/
opinion/Six-reasons-why-the-NHS-NationalProgramme-for-IT-failed
Mazmanian, A. (2014, February 27), Behind the
scenes at the HealthCare.gov tech surge, retrieved from The Business of Federal Technology
website: http://fcw.com/articles/2014/02/27/
healthcaredotgov-brill-recap.aspx
McBeth, R. (2016, April 12), NPfIT contracts to
get further £500m, retrieved from The digital-

38

SIM02-2018_article01.indd 38
https://aisel.aisnet.org/sim/vol23/iss2/2

16/07/2018 12:19

30

Fagnot et al.: Unpacking complexities of mega-scale public sector information te

UNPACKING COMPLEXITIES OF MEGA-SCALE PUBLIC SECTOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS

health.net website: http://www.digitalhealth.
net/clinical_software/47564/npfit-contracts-toget-further-%C2%A3500m
Mills, L. S., Soulé, M. E., & Doak, D. F. (1993),
“|The keystone-species concept in ecology
and conservation”, BioScience, vol. 43, n° 4,
p. 219-224.
Moore, J.F. (1996), The Death of Competition:
Leadership & Strategy in the Age of Business
Ecosystems, New York, Harper Business
Morgan, D., & Hunter, C. (2013, October
30), Timeline: U.S. healthcare law's technology breakdown (W. Dunham, Ed.), retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/30/us-usa-healthcare-delaysidUSBRE99T1C920131030
Murray, C. (2013, November 4), G4S and Serco
woes deepen with British fraud investigation,
retrieved October 29, 2014, retrieved from
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/11/04/usg4s-tagging-idUKBRE9A30OV20131104
Nather, D. (2014, February 28), How the Clinton
White House bungled health care reform,
POLITICO, retrieved from http://www.politico.
com/story/2014/02/bill-hillary-clinton-healthcare-reform-104109.html
National Audit Office (2006), The National Programme for IT in the NHS. London: National
Audit Office, The Stationery Office, 16 June
2006, available from: https://www.nao.org.uk/
wp-content/uploads/2006/06/05061173.pdf
National Audit Office (2008), The National Programme for IT in the NHS: Progress since 2006.
London: National Audit Office, The Stationery
Office, 16 May 2008, available from: www.nao.
org.uk/pn/07-08/0708484.htm
Newell, S., Goussevskaia, A., Swan, J., Bresnen,
M., & Obembe, A. (2008), “Interdependencies
in complex project ecologies: The case of biomedical innovation”, Long Range Planning,
vol. 41, n°1, p. 33–54.
New York Times News Service (1997, January
31), FBI lab assailed in bomb probe Okla. blast
evidence possibly mishandled, retrieved from
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1997-01-31/
news/1997031018_1_city-bombing-oklahoma-city-inspector-general

Odum, E. P. (1953), Fundamentals of Ecology. W.
B. Saunders, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.
Pear, R. (2009, June 10), Doctors’ group opposes public insurance plan, retrieved April,
2015, retrieved from http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/06/11/us/politics/11health.html
Pinto, J. K. (2013), “Lies, damned lies, and project plans: recurring human errors that can
ruin the project planning process”, Business
Horizons, vol. 56, n°5, p. 643–653.
Pinto, J. K. (2014), “Project management, governance, and the normalization of deviance”,
International Journal of Project Management, vol. 32, n°3, p. 376–387.
Pinto, J. K, & Slevin, D. P. (2006), “Organizational
governance and project success: lessons from
Boston’s Big Dig”, Concept Symposium 2006:
Principles of governance for major investment projects, Trondheim, Norway.
Purao, S., & Desouza, K. (2010), “Large IT projects as interventions in digital ecosystems”,
Proceedings of the International Conference
on Management of Emergent Digital EcoSystems, Bangkok, Thailand.
Purao, S., Desouza, K. C., & Becker, J. (2012),
“Investigating Failures in Large-Scale Public
Sector Projects with Sentiment Analysis”,
e-Service Journal, vol. 8, n°2, p. 84–105.
Rocheleau, B., & Wu, L. (2002), “Public versus
private information systems: Do they differ in
important ways? A review and empirical test”,
The American Review of Public Administration, vol. 32, n°4, p. 379–397.
Rong, K. & Shi, Y. (2009), “Constructing Business
Ecosystem from Firm Perspective: Cases in
High-tech Industry”, Proceedings of the International Conference on Management of
Emergent Digital EcoSystems, Lyon, France.
Schouten, F. (2013, September 19). “Kochbacked group launches new attack on
health care law”, USA Today, retrieved from
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/09/19/affordable-care-act-advertising-exchanges-health-care-president-obama-americans-for-prosperity-koch-brothers/2833979/

39

PublishedSIM02-2018_article01.indd
by AIS Electronic Library 39
(AISeL), 2018

16/07/2018 12:19

31

Systèmes d'Information et Management, Vol. 23 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 2

SYSTÈMES D’INFORMATION ET MANAGEMENT

Sessions, R. (2008), Simple Architectures for
Complex Enterprises, Redmond, Washington:
Microsoft Press.

Van Dyne, G. M., editor. (1969). The Ecosystem
Concept in Natural Resource Management.
Academic Press, New York, New York, USA.

Smith, M., Steinhauser, P., Bohn, K., Acosta, J.,
Aigner-Treworgy, A., Todd, B., & McConnell,
D. (2013, October 22), Obama: No 'sugarcoating' problems with health website, retrieved
October 29, 2014, from http://edition.cnn.
com/2013/10/21/politics/obamacare-problems/

Van Marrewijk, A. (2007), “Managing project
culture: The case of Environ Megaproject”,
International Journal of Project Management, vol. 25, n°3, p. 290–299.

Smith (August 2014), Fujitsu win legal battle with
the Department of Health over NPfIT money
pit, retrieved from http://spendmatters.com/
uk/fujitsu-win-legal-battle-with-the-department-of-health-over-npfit-money-pit/
State Health Insurance Marketplace Types (2013,
May 28), retrieved from The Henry J. Kaiser
Family Foundation website: http://kff.org/
health-reform/state-indicator/state-health-insurance-marketplace-types/
Stover, C. F. (1964), “Government Contract System as a Problem in Public Policy”, The George
Washington Law Review, vol. 32, p. 701.
Syal, R. (2013, September 17), Abandoned NHS
IT system has cost £10bn so far, retrieved from
the Guardian website: http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/sep/18/nhs-recordssystem-10bn
Smith, P. (2011, May 26), The NHS IT programme
– a failure of procurement?, retrieved from
http://spendmatters.com/uk/nhs-programmewill-happen-again/
Tansley, A. G. (1935), “The Use and Abuse of
Vegetational Concepts and Terms”, Ecology,
vol. 16, p. 284–307.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Management of the Trilogy Information Technology
Modernization Project (Report No. 05–07),
(2005, February), Washington, DC: Office of
the Inspector General.
The White House, Office of Administration.
(2014), Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO), retrieved from website: http://
www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/oa/
divisions/ocio
Thibodeau, P. (2013), “Healthcare. gov website
‘didn’t have a chance in hell’”, Computerworld
Healthcare IT.

Verton, D. (2003, April 1), FBI Has Made Major Progress, Former IT Chief Says, Computerworld.
Wainwright, D. and Waring, T. (2000), "The information management and technology strategy
of the UK National Health Service – Determining progress in the NHS acute hospital
sector", International Journal of Public Sector
Management, vol. 13, n°3, p.241-259.
Webster, P. C. (2012, November 29), After all the
time and money invested, will e-health ever
deliver on its promise? The Globe and Mail,
retrieved from http://www.theglobeandmail.
com/report-on-business/rob-magazine/afterall-the-time-and-money-invested-will-e-healthever-deliver-on-its-promise/article5796658/
Yang, J. L. (2013, October 25), QSSI, contractor
chosen to fix HealthCare.gov, faced questions from lawmakers last year, retrieved from
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/contractor-chosen-to-fix-healthcaregov-faced-questions-from-lawmakers-lastyear/2013/10/25/fe27e8ee-3da3-11e3-b6a9da62c264f40e_story.html
Yin, R. (1989), Case Study Research: Design and
Methods (3rd ed., Vol. 5), Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, Inc., retrieved from
http://www.hampp-ejournals.de/hampp-verlag-services/get?file=/frei/ZfP_1_2012_93
Yuttapongsontorn, N., Desouza, K. C., & Braganza, A. (2008), “Complexities of large-scale
technology project failure: A forensic analysis
of the Seattle popular monorail authority”,
Public Performance & Management Review,
vol. 31, n° 3, p. 443–478.
Yourdon, E. (2004). Death March (2nd ed.),
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hal.
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General (2005), The Federal Bureau
of Investigation's management of the trilogy
information technology modernization project: Audit Report No. 05–07.

40

SIM02-2018_article01.indd 40
https://aisel.aisnet.org/sim/vol23/iss2/2

16/07/2018 12:19

32

Fagnot et al.: Unpacking complexities of mega-scale public sector information te

UNPACKING COMPLEXITIES OF MEGA-SCALE PUBLIC SECTOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Report
to Congressional Requesters (2013), Patient
protection and the affordable care act: Status
of CMS efforts to establish federally facilitated
health insurance exchange (Report No. GAO13-601), retrieved from Government Accountability Office website: http://www.gao.gov/
assets/660/655291.pdf
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Report to
Congressional Requesters (2014), Ineffective
Planning and Oversight Practices Underscore
the Need for Improved Contract Management
(Report No. GAO-14-694), retrieved from
Government Accountability Office website:
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665179.pdf
U.S. Senate, Administrative Oversight and the
Courts, Committee on the Judiciary (2002),

FBI computers: 1992 hardware, 2002 problems
(S. HRG. 107–989), retrieved from Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office website: http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg87062/pdf/CHRG107shrg87062.pdf
U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations (2005),
Information technology modernization program, Trilogy: Hearings before the committee
on appropriations (S. Hrg. 109–76), retrieved
from Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office website: http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg20668/
html/CHRG-109shrg20668.htm

41

PublishedSIM02-2018_article01.indd
by AIS Electronic Library 41
(AISeL), 2018

16/07/2018 12:19

33

